University of Sussex

Graduate Student, Philosophy

School of History, Art History and Philosophy

Thesis Title: Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Moods

About

My research interest lies in 20th Century Continental Philosophy, notably in phenomenology and existentialism.

Title of Project:

The title of my proposed research-project is Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Moods. It is a title that situates the research within the discipline of 20th Century Continental Philosophy. It is a relatively broad title that does not readily make manifest or prescribe a particular orientation; nevertheless, there is good justificatory reason for the broadness of it. It relies on the conviction that the phenomenon of moods has not been adequately researched, down to its fundamental grounds, neither in the broad philosophical sense, nor in the specific phenomenological sense. In addition, it is a title that comprehensively approaches the operation of mood, in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy in its entirety. Mood appears in various forms throughout Heidegger’s philosophy (as “Befindlichkeit”, as “Stimmung”, as “Gestimmtheit”, as “Affekt” etc); it is one of the concepts that figures in both the early Heideggerian works and the later ones . Mood is a generic notion that leaves open the room for a systematic account that could unify Heidegger’s later work with the earlier work. Finally, the word mood is in the plural (moods) because the research will not only tackle the operational character of mood in Heidegger’s ontology but it will also examine issues pertaining to particular moods and the way Heidegger dealt with them (e.g. Angst, boredom, awe etc).   


Scope, aims and basic approach of project:

The research focuses on the operation of mood (Befindlichkeit/Stimmung) in Martin Heidegger’s ontology. It aims to provide a comprehensive account of the way mood operates in Heidegger’s ontology as well as to explore its significance and defining role in the very development (the so called “Kehre”) of Heidegger’s thought.
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology systematically attends to “everydayness” and the pre-theoretical consciousness that is characteristic of it. In this context, Heidegger raised the significance of moods to an ontological level: Moods are not simply subjective, secondary, phenomena that accompany understanding, but they are modes of disclosing the world itself as a meaningful totality of references and engaged involvements.
Heidegger justified the exigency to attend to the pre-theoretical aspect of understanding, by virtue of the hermeneutic principle that every act of knowing and every concept of knowledge is always already preceded and guided by a pre-theoretical grasp of the phenomenon, which is embedded in a mood. Thus, both non-philosophical (ontical), as well as philosophical (ontological), understanding [Verstehen] are accompanied by and formed within a mood. In this context, Heidegger ascribes to mood an epistemological “disclosive operation” whereby a Mood discloses the facticity of our existence, as a fundamental mode of Being-In-the-World [In-der-Welt-Sein]. This operation is philosophically invaluable, as it undercuts the problem of skepticism by positing the Dasein as neither a self-enclosed subject nor as an object, rather, as a dynamic being that is itself  in-between (Zwischen) a subject and an object, always already within a World.
Heidegger’s thematization of moods is an important part of his deconstruction of the “presuppositionless scientific standpoint” that accompanies his criticism of theorizing and metaphysics. In addition, what Heidegger says of moods is also important for his criticism of the subject-object dichotomy. In so far as mood denotes the pre-reflective way in which Dasein already finds itself situated in the world, it signifies an irreducible “in-between” the subject and the object (the mind and the world). Mood is therefore a mode of disclosure that exists prior to experiential bifurcation and as such transcends subjectivity.
Beyond the quasi-epistemological disclosive operation of mood, there is another, equally important yet unexplored, operation of mood: a kinetic operation that is fundamentally intertwined within Dasein’s facticity [Faktizität]. In Being and Time, Heidegger connects Stimmung with “sheer thatness” but also with movement and the phenomenon of undergoing a change. In the late lecture What is Philosophy? (1955), Heidegger, following Plato and Aristotle, determines mood as the archē of philosophy. But even before that, in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing) (1936-38), Heidegger envisioned a cultural transformation that would constitute a “new beginning” of thinking, whose beginning he connected with a Grundstimmung. In this context, it has been argued by certain commentators  that moods supply the “binding necessity” for the cultural transformation that Heidegger envisioned. This remains an operational significance that is still underexplored, especially in connection to Heidegger’s political discourse. 
The meaning of mood has not been adequately researched and clarified by Heideggerian scholarship, despite its significance. In this context, Heidegger’s philosophical “turn” (i.e. the change in focus, from the ‘existential analytic of Dasein’ to the ‘temporal analytic of Being’), appears systematically incomprehensible partly because of an inadequate analysis of mood. In this regard, my research addresses and aims to clarify particular problems, for example, how Heidegger appropriates the Aristotelian concepts of ἔξις and διάθεσις, why he privileges Angst in Being and Time; why he later privileges boredom, how moods relate to temporal consciousness, historicity and cultural history, et cetera.
A better understanding of mood will not only contribute to a narrow technical aspect of Heideggerian scholarship, but it will reverberate in other aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy, thus providing an important contribution to phenomenology. My research will provide new insights into the genealogy of the notion of Mood in Heidegger’s thought, based on Heidegger’s nuanced analyses and appropriations of Aristotle’s vocabulary. But a better understanding of Heideggerian mood will also contribute to the wider mind-body problem that ensues from Cartesian methodological skepticism, as well as to Heidegger’s criticism of Kantian ethics. In this context, Heidegger’s focus on moods can be conceptualized as a response to the epistemological problems that captivated the Cartesian train of thought, as well as a response to the problems of deontological ethics.     
Heidegger was the first philosopher to systematically incorporate moods in a phenomenology. Moods therefore are not only important from an ontological standpoint, but also from a methodological one. It is my intention to address a broader phenomenological audience in assessing and charting the possibilities of a phenomenology of moods.
My research will consist of two methodological approaches, each complementing the other: a genealogical exegetic approach and a constructive evaluative approach.
A good part of the research will be genealogical exegetic, in the sense that it will engage in a textual explicatory analysis of Heidegger’s etymological and other conceptual maneuvers from which Heidegger discerns the fundamental concepts of his philosophy. This part aims to enrich the current knowledge of the genealogy of the concepts of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung. In this context, Heidegger’s early lectures on Plato and Aristotle will constitute a fundamental source of knowledge.
The other half of the research will be constituted by a constructive evaluative approach, in the sense that it will address the philosophical problems of Heidegger’s works with respect to the concept of mood, beyond their linguistic character, evaluating their phenomenological adequacy. This also entails facing up to the quasi-political discourse that Heidegger’s appeal to moods produces (as Heidegger anchored the vision of a cultural transformation to the experience of a fundamental mood). In this context, I will address questions like why Heidegger’s phenomenology relies so much on linguistic analysis (which the exegetic part of my research uncritically confirms), or why Heidegger privileges particular moods at the expense of others.     

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